

SECURITY INFORMATION

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M. Dulles

PSB D/B-3

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SUGGESTED REVISED TEXT OF GENERAL CONCLUSIONS,
PAGES 1 and 2 of THE STATUS REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
EFFORT (PSB D-30)

The following suggested text is an attempt to revise the "general conclusions" of the Psychological Strategy Board Report so as to meet the objections to them by the Department of State, and, at the same time, to incorporate proposals submitted by the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency:

1. To be fully effective, psychological planning at the strategic level should ideally be based on an agreed overall strategic concept for our national psychological programs. While efforts to date underline the difficulties of formulating such a concept, some progress has been made in achieving agreement on certain broad criteria to be utilized in establishing relative priorities within existing capabilities. Further progress toward the development and implementation of an agreed strategic concept for our psychological effort can take place only in conjunction with a corresponding development of capabilities and resources and an accompanying adjustment of basic national policy.

2. The United States is not making significant progress in the psychological field toward its objective of reduction and retraction of Soviet power as laid down in NSC 20/4; nor is it clear that the United States is even holding its own in the psychological struggle against Soviet communism, except in certain areas, such as Western Europe, where good progress can be recorded under NATO. The difficulty appears to lie partly in Soviet measures which maintain the Iron Curtain with increasing effectiveness, and partly in the time required to develop the requisite capabilities.

3. A major handicap in psychological operations outside of the Iron Curtain derives from growing resentment in parts of Asia and throughout much of Europe to a "made in America" label on part of our psychological output. Of even graver significance is the increasing reaction against the military character of some of our political and economic activity. Programs designed to have a deterrent effect on the Soviet Union are distorted and exploited by communist or anti-American propaganda and thus are occasioning resistance, neutralism, and charges of aggressiveness to the detriment of our psychological effort.

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REVISIONS SUGGESTED BY CIA

1. Page 3, line 3: Sentence beginning "In the Middle East" to be deleted and following substituted:

"In the Middle East, irresponsible nationalism is the current major threat to free world interests. United States capabilities for effective psychological action have declined though some slow progress is reported in certain sections of the Moslem world."

2. Page 3, second line of paragraph number 1: Delete words, "particularly but not solely Western Europe".

3. Page 5, line 5: Delete this sentence and substitute:

"The Soviet grip in the Communist-dominated areas of Europe and of the Far East appeared to be even firmer at the end of the fiscal year 1952 than at the beginning."

4. Page 6, last complete paragraph: Delete first sentence and substitute:

"In the overt information field behind the Iron Curtain, the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe clearly emerge from the reports as the only significant remaining programs which effectively reach the people of either or both the USSR and the Satellites."